Checkpoint the party/runtime stack before share-program and malicious-mode work.

Ship the TLS mesh, composer, Beaver/Yao/leaf MPC, prep/online paths, apps, and docs so the tree is pushable before elevating share_expr, security_mode, and prep resume.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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Ryan Henry 2026-09-28 05:59:19 -06:00
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Everything past a plain two-party point key.
The home page is the short version. Open a page for the snippet and the header.
## Keys and evaluation
- [Verifiability & authenticity](@ref verifiability)
- [Programmability](@ref programmability)
- [Comparisons & ranges](@ref comparisons)
- [Multipoint keys](@ref multipoint_keys)
- [Multiparty & 3-server](@ref multiparty)
- [Dealer-free keygen](@ref dealer_free)
- [Beaver triples](@ref beaver_triples)
- [Grotto](@ref jet_and_ring)
- [Point-programmable vector commitments](@ref ppvc_manual)
- [Application sketches](@ref applications)
## Network and MPC around the keys
These are first-class in the tree — see the overview, then dig in:
- [Network, parties, and MPC](@ref network_and_mpc) — map of the runtime stack
- [Protocol composition](@ref protocol_compose)
- [Beaver triples](@ref beaver_triples)
- [Arithmetic share runtime](@ref arith_runtime)
- [A boolean function of a leaf](@ref yao_leaf)
- [Logging, statistics, and experiments](@ref experiment_costs) — run log, CSVs, replayable seeds